



















Abstract  A recent survey of 1,948 retail stores in India conducted by the World Bank’s 
Enterprise Surveys shows that 19 percent of the stores use computers for their business. 
In some states like Kerala, computer usage is as high as 40 percent. Using this data we 
find labor regulation as an important determinant of computer usage. The estimates 
suggest that when faced with burdensome labor regulations, the probability of using a 
computer rises by over 36 percentage points for an average store. These findings formally 
confirm a commonly held but untested view that labor regulation may be responsible for 
the spread of labor saving modern technology. 
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1.  Introduction 
A new survey of 1,948 retail stores in India compiled by the World Bank’s Enterprise 
Surveys shows that 19% of the stores use computers for their business. Computer usage 
is higher among stores that find labor regulations to be more burdensome. Specifically, 
16% of the stores who report labor regulations as “no obstacle” for their business use 
computers. Corresponding figures for stores reporting labor regulations as “minor”, 
“moderate”, “major or very severe” obstacles are 24%, 30% and 34%, respectively. We 
test if computer usage in India’s retail sector is driven by the severity of labor regulations. 
  Existing empirical work has paid little attention to the technology-labor 
regulations nexus.
1 Few studies which do exist treat the choice of technology as 
exogenous to labor regulations. For example, Card et al (1999) take computer usage in 
the Canada, France and the US as an exogenous technological shock. They find that the 
effect of this shock on wages and employment depends on labor regulations in the three 
countries. In recent theoretical contributions, Alesina and Zeira (2006) and Blanchard and 
Philippon (2006) have argued that the choice of technology should be treated as 
endogenous to labor regulations. Our findings confirm this argument. 
 
2.  Data and Main Variables 
We use store level data collected by the World Bank in 2006.
2 The data are a pure cross 
section of 1,948 stores spread over 16 states and 41 cities of India. Our dependent 
variable, Computers, is a dummy which equals 1 if a store uses a computer for running its 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Silanes and Shleifer (2004). 
2 The survey and methodology for data collection are available at www.enterprisesurveys.org.    2
business and 0 otherwise.
3 The mean value of Computers is .19 and standard deviation is 
.39. Our main explanatory variable is an index of labor regulation defined at the state 
level.
4 In one survey question, stores were asked if labor regulations were an obstacle for 
their business. Responses were recorded on a 0-4 scale defined as no obstacle (0), minor 
obstacle (1), moderate obstacle (2), major obstacle (3), and very severe obstacle (4). Our 
main index of labor regulation, Perception index, equals the proportion of stores in a state 
who report labor regulations as a problem (minor obstacle or higher).
5 Being a group 
(state) average, the Perception index suffers less from measurement errors and 
endogeneity problems associated with firm perceptions (Kreuger and Angrist, 2001). As 
a robustness check, we also use an index of labor regulation for the manufacturing sectors 
in India (Law Book index) due to Besley and Burgess (2004). For the Law Book index, 
we use the latest year (2000) values for which the index is available. The motivation is 
that pro-labor governments are likely to implement labor-friendly laws in both 
manufacturing and services. Correlation between Perception and Law Book index is .564. 
  One concern could be that labor regulation is likely to be correlated with other 
regulations such as tax rates, land laws, corruption, etc. However, this is not a problem 
for us because we expect these (other) regulations to be positively correlated with labor 
regulation but have a negative effect on computer usage. Thus, failure to control for tax 
rates, etc., will only weaken the positive association we intend to show between computer 
usage and labor regulations (downward bias in the estimated coefficient of labor 
regulation). To confirm this, we use store response (on the same 0-4 scale as above) to 
                                                 
3 Data on the number of workers using computers or hours of computer usage is not available. 
4 In India, labor regulations are made and implemented by the state governments. 
5 Our results are virtually unchanged if we use state level averages of the actual scores here. The Perception 
index varies between .09 (Gujarat) and .528 (West Bengal) with a mean of .249.    3
questions on tax rates, tax administration, land laws (access to land), business licensing 
and permits, corruption and restrictions on store hour operations as obstacles to growth. 
Indices similar to the Perception index were first computed for each of these (non-labor) 
regulations and then a simple average was taken over them to arrive at Regulation – an 
overall index of non-labor regulations. The sub indices of Regulation are all highly 
(positively) correlated and our results are unaffected whether we use Regulation or its sub 
indices. We expect a negative effect of Regulation and a positive effect of the labor 
regulation index on computer usage. We single out the sub-index on land laws (Land 
index) for special treatment because it shows little correlation with the Perception index. 
The correlation coefficient between the Perception index and the Land index is .39 and it 
drops to .06 if we exclude the states of West Bengal and Gujarat (16% of the sample) 
which are outliers (Figure 1). What this suggests is that at least in the bulk (84%) of the 
sample we can easily contrast the effects of labor and land regulations on computer use. 
  A second concern is that labor regulations could be correlated with overall 
development, biasing our results. The most plausible scenario is that labor regulations are 
stricter in less developed states. This negative relationship between labor regulation and 
overall development again implies a downward bias in the estimated labor regulation-
computer usage relationship because the direct effect of less development is likely to be 
less computer usage. For example, the index of overall development due to Banerjee and 
Iyer (2005), BI index, shows a negative correlation with the Perception index (correlation 
of -.290) but is positively correlated with the percentage of stores in a state who use 
computers (correlation of .320). Below we control for a number of proxy measures of 
overall development and the results confirm our claim of the downward bias.   4
  The last concern relates to a possible correlation between labor regulation and 
store characteristics. We looked at a number of store characteristics and found these to be 
only weakly correlated with the Perception index. For example, averaged at the state 
level, current employment, current sales and floor area of the shop show a correlation of  
-.125, .088 and -.109, respectively, with the Perception index. Our results for labor 
regulation hardly change due to store level controls (discussed below). 
 
3.  Estimation 
We use a probit specification clustering the standard errors on the state. Estimated 
marginal effects (at the mean value of the explanatory variables) are reported in Table 1. 
Our main control is the Land index for reasons discussed above. Using the Perception 
index, we find no significant effect of labor regulation on computer usage without any 
controls. In column 1 of Table 1 we control for the Land index. Labor regulation now 
shows a significant effect (at less than 5%). Specifically, a 1 percentage point increase in 
the number of stores who find labor regulation to be a problem raises computer usage by 
.179 percentage points. In contrast, stricter land laws have a negative effect on computer 
usage (significant at less than 1% level). For overall development we use ratio of females 
to males (Sex ratio) at the city level.
6 Other proxy measures like literacy rates, etc. are 
used in the robustness checks below. Column 2 of Table 1 shows that controlling for Sex 
ratio increases the estimated coefficient of labor regulations from .179 to .189 (p-value of 
.004) confirming the downward bias discussed above. Sex ratio has a positive effect on 
                                                 
6 The correlation between Sex ratio and Perception index is -.237 in the full sample and -.077 in the 
restricted sample (excluding West Bengal and Gujarat). We use (lagged) 1991 values of Sex ratio taken 
from Census of India (1991). Our results do not change if we use 2001 values of sex ratio.   5
computer usage (significant at less than 1% level). Estimation results for the restricted 
sample (West Bengal and Gujarat dropped) are almost similar to the ones above. 
 
4.  Robustness 
In column 3 we add the control for Regulation. As expected, Regulation has a negative 
effect on computer usage (significant at less than 1% level) and controlling for it 
increases the coefficient of the labor regulation index from .189 to .346. In column 4 we 
add controls for overall development: BI index, literacy rate, labor force participation 
rate, total adult population (size of the city) and share of services in total employment.
7 
Population and participation rates also control for differences in labor supply across cities 
in which our stores are located.
8 The impact of these controls is an increase in the 
estimated coefficient of labor regulation (column 3 vs. column 4) which supports our 
claim of the downward bias. In column 5 we control for a host of store level 
characteristics: floor area of the shop (thousand square feet), age of the store, duration of 
power outages per day (Outage) and five dummy variables capturing (equal to 1) if a 
store owns a generator (Generator), has a checking/savings account (Checking), a line of 
credit, overdraft facility (Overdraft) and felt no need to borrow from external sources in 
the last fiscal year (Liquid). With these controls added the coefficient of the labor 
regulation index remains positive and significant at less than 5% level.
9 It drops in 
magnitude from .412 to .369 which is partly due to the difference in sample size between 
                                                 
7 Apart from the BI index, all other development proxies mentioned here are at the city level, for the year 
1991 (lagged) and taken from Census of India (1991). Our results are same if we use 2001 values instead. 
8 Population of the city is expressed in thousands.  
9 This result holds with a host of other controls too. Examples include: a dummy for the metropolitan cities 
of Mumbai, Kolkatta, New Delhi, Chennai, Bangalore and Hyderabad, per capita income of the state (2001, 
1991 values), number of telephone lines per capita at the state level (city level data is not available) and 
store level variables for: current sales, days of inventory, store is audited or not.   6
the two columns (due to missing observations) and partly due to the control for age of the 
store. Our main result of a positive and significant effect of labor regulation on computer 




The paper shows that rising computer usage in India’s retail sector is in part driven by 
burdensome labor regulations. The findings suggest a labor saving motive which we 
confirm in a companion paper. We have also shown that existing work on the labor 
regulation-technology-employment/wages nexus may suffer from specification problems 
in that it treats the choice of technology by firms as exogenous to labor regulations. Our 
results contradict the exogeneity assumption. 
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Figure 1 











































AP: Andhra Pradesh 
UP: Uttar Pradesh 
MP: Madhya Pradesh 
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Table 1: Marginal effects from Probit regressions  
Dependent variable: Computers      
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
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2  .015 .029 .030 .032  .323 
Sample Size  1948  1948  1948  1948  1893 
p-values in brackets; significance level is denoted by ***(1% or less), ** (5% or 
less) and * (10% or less). All standard errors are clustered on the state. Sample 
size smaller in column 5 due to missing observations and one outlier dropped. 
 
 
 
 
 